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Abstract
This paper proposes a new class of potential games, the nested potential games, which
generalize the potential games defined in Monderer and Shapley (1996), as well as the
pseudo-potential games defined in Dubey et al. (2006). We show that each maximizer of a
nested potential is a Nash equilibrium.
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This paper proposes a class of nested potential games that generalize poten-
tial games introduced in Monderer and Shapley (1996).
In the literature, various classes of potential games have been proposed
and analyzed.1 These potential games have in common an attractive feature
that every maximizer of a potential, a real valued function over the set of ac-
tion proﬁles, is a (pure) Nash equilibrium of the game.2 That is, in potential
games, the problem of ﬁnding a Nash equilibrium is a simple maximization
problem rather than a ﬁxed point problem.3
This paper shows that the above feature is inherited by some games that
do not have a potential in the conventional sense. Speciﬁcally, we propose
a new concept of ‘nested’ potentials as follows. In a potential game, it is as
if the potential is a payoﬀ function of one representative agent who chooses
strategies for all players. In considering a nested potential, we think of a
representative agent for a subset T of players instead of all of them: for each
player i in T, given any strategy proﬁle of other players, maximizing this
representative agent’s payoﬀ fT yields a best response for player i.
Suppose that there is a partition T of players such that, for each member
T of T , there is such a representative agent whose payoﬀ function is fT. Then
the collection of fT’s can be seen as a new strategic form game, where each
member T in T is regarded as a single player. That is, the original game is
reduced to a game with a smaller number of players.
Notice that such reduction can be nested: the new game among step
1 representative agents may be reduced to a game with an even smaller
number of players, by considering a step 2 representative agent for step 1
representative agents, and then a representative agent of these, and so on.
We say that a game has a nested potential if a game is reduced to a game
with one representative agent through this process.
This paper shall show that the nested potentials are natural generaliza-
tions of the existing notions of potentials:
• The nested potential games strictly expand the class of pseudo-potential
games deﬁned in Dubey et al. (2006) (see Example 2.5).
1For example, exact potentials, weighted potentials, ordinal potentials, generalized
ordinal potentials are introduced in Monderer and Shapley (1996); (ordinal) best response
potentials in Voorneveld (2000); pseudo-potentials in Dubey et al. (2006); best response
potentials and better response potentials in Morris and Ui (2004); generalized potentials,
monotone potentials, and local potentials in Morris and Ui (2005); iterated potentials in
Oyama and Tercieux (2004), and so on.
2An exception is the generalized potential deﬁned in Morris and Ui (2005), which is a
function on a covering of the set of action proﬁles.
3Rosenthal (1973) ﬁrst shows that there exists a function which is later called a potential
in congestion games and demonstrates that every congestion game possesses a pure Nash
equilibrium which corresponds to the maximizer of the function. It is also known that
potential games admit reﬁnements of equilibria. See for example Blume (1993), Hofbauer
and Sorger (1999,2002), Morris and Ui (2005), Oyama et al. (2003), Oyama and Tercieux
(2004), and Ui (2000).
1• In a nested potential game, each maximizer of the nested potential is
a Nash equilibrium (see Proposition 2.8).
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the
nested potentials. It is shown that the nested potential is a strict generaliza-
tion of the pseudo-potential and that its maximizer is a Nash equilibrium.
Section 3 shows that a similar nesting procedure does not expand the class
of weighted potential games.
2 Nested pseudo-potential games
A strategic form game consists of a ﬁnite player set N = {1,...,n}, a ﬁnite or
inﬁnite action set Ai for i ∈ N, and the payoﬀ function gi : A → R for i ∈ N,
where A :=
∏
i∈N Ai. Since we ﬁx the set A of action proﬁles, we denote
a strategic form game (N,(Ai)i∈N,(gi)i∈N) simply by gN := (gi)i∈N. For
notational convenience, we write a = (ai)i∈N ∈ A; for i ∈ N, A−i =
∏
j̸=i Aj
and a−i = (aj)j̸=i ∈ A−i; and for T ⊆ N, AT =
∏
i∈T Ai, aT = (ai)i∈T ∈ AT,
A−T =
∏
i∈N\T Ai, and a−T = (ai)i∈N\T ∈ A−T. We write (aT,a−T) ∈
AT × A−T. We write (ai,a−i) instead of (a{i},a−{i}) for simplicity.
Let gN be a strategic form game. Beginning with Monderer and Shapley
(1996), various notions of potential games have been proposed. Among them,
one of the weakest notions is the pseudo-potential games introduced in Dubey
et al. (2006). A pseudo-potential of game gN is a real valued function f
on the set A of action proﬁles such that, for each player i, i’s best-response
against the other players’ actions a−i in the alternative game where i’s payoﬀ
function is given by f is that in the original game gN:




f(ai,a−i) ⊆ arg max
ai∈Ai
gi(ai,a−i) (1)
for all a−i ∈ A−i. If gN has a pseudo-potential, gN is called a pseudo-potential
game.4
We shall extend this idea by introducing a weaker notion where a ‘pseudo-
potential’ is considered for each subset of players instead of the entire set.
For a partition T of N, we deﬁne the T -pseudo-potentials as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.2 Let T be a partition of N. A T -pseudo-potential of gN is
a tuple (T ,(AT)T∈T ,(fT)T∈T ), where, for each T ∈ T , fT : A → R satisﬁes
4If the inclusion of (1) can be replaced by the equality, f is called an (ordinal)best-
response potential, which is introduced in Voorneveld (2000). The pseudo-potentials gen-
eralize the (ordinal) best-response potentials. Morris and Ui (2004, 5) also introduced
alternative best-response potentials, which are special classes of (ordinal) best-response
potentials of Voorneveld (2000) and the pseudo-potentials in Dubey et al. (2006). See
Morris and Ui (2004) for more discussion of this notion. We can apply the analogous
arguments in this section to these best response potential of Morris and Ui (2004).
2that, for each i ∈ T,
arg max
ai∈Ai
fT(ai,a−i) ⊆ arg max
ai∈Ai
gi(ai,a−i) (2)
for all a−i ∈ A−i.5
We denote such a T -pseudo-potential (T ,(AT)T∈T ,(fT)T∈T ) by fT := (fT)T∈T
since action sets (AT)T∈T can be derived from the partition T of N and the
set A of action proﬁles in the original game gN.
Remark 2.3 The T -pseudo-potential generalizes Monderer (2007)’s q-potential:
a strategic form game gN has a q-potential if and only if gN has a T -potential,
where q refers to the number of elements in T and the potential is meant to
be the exact potential in Monderer and Shapley (1996). If gN is a q-potential
game, then it has a T -pseudo-potential such that the number of elements of
T is q. The converse is not true, since there is a pseudo-potential game
without an exact potential.
Notice that we can regard each T -pseudo-potential fT as a strategic form
game, where T is the player set; for each T ∈ T , AT is the action set of T;
and for each T ∈ T , fT is the payoﬀ function of T. The idea of the nested
pseudo-potential games is to construct such games iteratively:
Deﬁnition 2.4 A function f : A → R is a nested pseudo-potential of gN






k=0 is a nest sequence of N: {T k}K
k=0 is an increasingly coarser
sequence of partitions of N with T 0 = {{i}|i ∈ N} and T K = {N};
• fT 0 = (f0
T)T∈T 0 is the original game gN: for each i ∈ N, f0
{i}(a) = gi(a)
for all a ∈ A;
• for each k = 1,2,...,K, fT k = (fk
T)T∈T k is a T k-pseudo-potential of
fT k−1 = (f
k−1
T )T∈T k−1, where fT k−1 is regarded as a strategic form game










for all a−Tk−1 ∈ A−Tk−1; and
• fT K = (fK
N ) is such that fK
N (a) = f(a) for all a ∈ A.
A game that admits a nested pseudo-potential is called a nested pseudo-
potential game.
5Note that gN has a T -pseudo-potential if and only if, for each member T of T , for
any strategies a−T of all players outside T, the subgame restricted by a−T is a pseudo-
potential game. Note also that gN is a pseudo-potential game if and only if it has a
{N}-pseudo-potential.
3For two-person games, it is clear that the set of nested pseudo-potential
games is equivalent to that of pseudo-potential games. For games with more
than two players, the set of nested pseudo-potential games strictly includes
that of pseudo-potential games. Indeed, since each pseudo-potential is a
nested pseudo-potential, if gN is a pseudo-potential game, then it is a nested
pseudo-potential game. The next example demonstrates the strict inclusion.
Example 2.5 Consider the three-person game g{1,2,3} represented as Table
1, where player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3
chooses the matrix; players 1 and 2 have identical interests, player 3’s payoﬀ
is the same as others when player 1 chooses a1, but is reversed otherwise as























1,a2,a3). Since pseudo-potential games cannot
have strict best response cycles as shown by Schipper (2004), this game is
not a pseudo-potential game.
However, g{1,2,3} is a nested pseudo-potential game. Indeed, (f1
{1,2},f1
{3})
given in Table 2 is a {{1,2},{3}}-pseudo-potential of g{1,2,3}, where f1
{1,2}(·) =



























Regarding the {{1,2},{3}}-pseudo-potential (f1
{1,2},f1
{3}) as a strategic form
game, we can show that (f2
{1,2,3}) deﬁned in Table 3 is a {{1,2,3}}-pseudo-
potential of (f1
{1,2},f1
{3}). Thus g{1,2,3} is a nested pseudo-potential game.
Remark 2.6 For a nested pseudo-potential game, the sequence (fT k)K
k=0
cannot be freely chosen. That is, even if a game has a nested pseudo-
potential, one may not arrive at it with a wrong choice of partitions or payoﬀ
numbers. This point is illustrated below.
Example 2.7 Consider the game g{1,2,3} in Example 2.5 again. Note that
( ˆ f1
{1,2},f1
{3}) given in Table 4 is also a {{1,2},{3}}-pseudo-potential of g{1,2,3}.
4However, regarding a {{1,2},{3}}-pseudo-potential ( ˆ f1
{1,2},f1
{3}) as a strate-










1,a2),a3) in ( ˆ f1
{1,2},f1
{3}), and thus ( ˆ f1
{1,2},f1
{3})











Table 4: ( ˆ f1
{1,2},f1
{3})
The essential property shared by all existing versions of potential games
is that maximizers of a potential function are Nash equilibria. The nested
pseudo-potential proposed here inherits this property. To see this, let gN be
a game with a nested pseudo-potential f. We say that an action proﬁle a∗ is
a nested pseudo-potential maximizer (NPP-maximizer) of gN if f(a∗) ≥ f(a)
for all a ∈ A. A NPP-maximizer, if it exists, is a Nash equilibrium of the
underlying game:
Proposition 2.8 Let gN be a nested pseudo-potential games with a NPP-
maximizer a∗. Then, a∗ is a Nash equilibrium of gN.
In order to establish the above proposition, the following lemma concern-
ing T -pseudo-potentials is useful:
Lemma 2.9 Suppose that gN has a T -pseudo-potential fT , where T is a
partition of N. If an action proﬁle a∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium of fT ,
where fT is regarded as a strategic form game, it is a pure Nash equilibrium
of gN.
This lemma is a generalization of a claim concerning q-potential games in
Monderer (2007).
Proof. Suppose an action proﬁle a∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium of fT . Fix
any i ∈ N. Take T ∈ T such that i ∈ T. Since a∗ is a Nash equilibrium of
fT , fT(a∗) − fT(aT,a∗
−T) ≥ 0 for all aT ∈ AT. Since (ai,a∗
T\{i}) ∈ AT for any
ai ∈ Ai, we have fT(a∗) − fT(a{i},a∗
T\{i},a∗
−T) ≥ 0. Since fT is a T -pseudo-
potential of g, it implies that gi(a∗) − gi(ai,a∗




−T), which completes the proof.
We prove Proposition 2.8 by applying Lemma 2.9 iteratively.
Proof of Proposition 2.8. Let a∗ be a NPP-maximizer of gN. Let K be
a positive integer and (fT k)K
k=0 be a sequence such that fT 0 is the original
game gN; for each k = 1,2,...,K, fT k is a T k-pseudo-potential of fT k−1,
where fT k−1 is regarded as a strategic form game as above; and fT K is such
that T K = {N} and fK
N (a) = f(a) for all a ∈ A.
5By regarding fT K = (fK
N ) = (f) as a one-person game, since f is a
pseudo-potential of fT k−1, a∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium of fT K−1 by Lemma
2.9. Similarly, for any k = 1,2,...,K − 1, if a∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium
fT k, then it is a pure Nash equilibrium of fT k−1. Therefore, a∗ is a Nash
equilibrium of gN = fT 0, which completes the proof.
The idea of nested pseudo-potential games is well deﬁned for games with
arbitrary action sets. For games with ﬁnite strategy sets, Proposition 2.8
implies that if the game has a nested pseudo-potential, then there exists a
pure Nash equilibrium:
Corollary 2.10 Every nested potential game with ﬁnite action sets possesses
a pure Nash equilibrium.
3 Nested weighted potential games
The idea of iterative construction of potential functions is general and so one
might be interested in applying it to other potentials. But this is not neces-
sarily fruitful: we show that the class of weighted potential games deﬁned in
Monderer and Shapley (1996) does not expand through nesting.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A function f : A → R is a weighted potential of gN if, for
each i ∈ N, there exists a positive weight wi > 0 such that
f(ai,a−i) − f(a
′




i ∈ Ai and for all a−i ∈ A−i. If gN has a weighted potential, then
it is called a weighted potential game.6
We deﬁne nested weighted potential games following the same steps as before:
Deﬁnition 3.2 A weighted T -potential of gN is a tuple (T ,(AT)T∈T ,(fT)T∈T ),
where, for each T ∈ T , fT : A → R satisﬁes that, for each i ∈ T, there exists
a weight wi > 0 such that
fT(ai,a−i) − fT(a
′




i ∈ Ai and a−i ∈ A−i.
We denote such a weighted T -potential (T ,(AT)T∈T ,(fT)T∈T ) by fT :=
(fT)T∈T .
Deﬁnition 3.3 A function f : A → R is a nested weighted potential of gN
if there exist a positive integer K and a sequence (fT k)K
k=0 such that
• {T k}K
k=0 is a nest sequence of N;
6If wi = 1 for all i ∈ N, gN is called an exact potential game and f is called an exact
potential.
6• fT 0 is the original game gN;
• for each k = 1,2,...,K, fT k is a weighted T k-potential of fT k−1; and
• fT K = (fK
N ) is such that fK
N (a) = f(a) for all a ∈ A.
It turns out that the class of nested weighted potential games is no larger
than that of weighted potential games:
Proposition 3.4 gN is a weighted potential game if and only if it is a nested
weighted potential game.
Proof. It is clear that if gN is a weighted potential game then it is a nested
weighted potential game. Conversely, suppose that gN is a nested weighted





k=0 be such that {i} = T 0 ⊆ T 1 ⊆ ··· ⊆ T K−1 ⊆ T K = N,
T k ∈ T k and wk


















Tk−1 ∈ ATk−1, a−Tk−1 ∈ A−Tk−1, and k = 0,...,K; and
f0
T0(a) = gi(a) for all a ∈ A, fK
TK(a) = f(a) for all a ∈ A. Fix any ai,a′
i ∈ Ai
and a−i ∈ A−i. Let a−i = (aTK−1\{i},a−TK−1) = (aTK−2\{i},a−TK−2) = ··· =

































































Thus, gN is a weighted potential game.
We can also construct a nested version of exact potential games, ordinal
potential games and generalized ordinal games as deﬁned by Monderer and
Shapley (1996). However, a similar argument shows that gN is an exact
(resp. ordinal and generalized ordinal) potential game if and only if it is a
nested exact (resp. nested ordinal and nested generalized ordinal) potential
game.7
7This means that the nested construction of q-potentials is also not fruitful.
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